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Intellectual property rights (IPR) have recently moved to the forefront of debates over international 
policy. As each country establishes its own institutions of IPR, a divergence exists between net producers 
and net consumers in the returns to providing strong protection. Under pressure from the developed 
world, many developing countries have begun to strengthen their IPR, particularly as regards patents. 
These changes in policy provide us with an opportunity to learn more about the effects of intellectual 
property institutions in developing countries. Whether and to what extent do stronger IPR spur inventive 
activity in a developing country? What are the factors or characteristics of industries in which 
strengthening patent rights has the most favorable impact on inventive activity? Will the strengthening of 
IPR in developing countries induce more foreign direct investment and technology transfer from abroad? 
In an attempt to answer these questions, this paper uses the 1986 Taiwanese patent reforms to examine 
the impact of strengthening patent rights in a developing economy. The evidence on the number of 
patents awarded to Taiwanese inventors as well as that on R&D spending in Taiwan suggests that the 
reforms stimulated additional inventive activity, especially in industries where patent protection is 
generally regarded as an effective strategy for extracting returns, and in industries which are more R&D 
intensive. The reforms also seemed to induce additional foreign direct investment in Taiwan. On the 
other hand, for industries that chiefly use other mechanisms to extract returns from their innovations, 
such as secrecy, the strengthening of patent rights had little effect on their inventive activity.  Neither 
investment in R&D nor the number of patents awarded in these industries appeared to be much affected 
by the strengthening of patent protection. 
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Intellectual property rights have recently moved to the forefront of debates on 
international economic policy.  This should not be surprising, given the important role of 
intellectual property (as embodied in patents, copyrights, or trademarks) in the production of 
goods and services today, as well as the continued rapid growth in the volumes of 
international trade and investment.  Further accentuating the significance of whether nations 
cooperate or come into conflict over intellectual property rights, however, are the enormous 
differences across them in the rates at which they generate new technologies, ideas, and 
products.  Because such inventions and creations can often be easily copied or imitated, and 
because each country establishes its own institutions of intellectual property, there is an 
obvious divergence between net producers and net consumers of new technological 
knowledge in the returns to providing strong intellectual property rights.
1 
The institutions of intellectual property protection of new technologies that countries 
adopt generally do reflect the significance of this distinction.  Traditionally, developing 
countries have established weaker regimes favoring technological diffusion through imitation 
and acquisition from abroad.  For example, although it rose as a global star in science and 
technology in the 1980s, Japan was a major source of international counterfeit goods in the 
1960s.
2  In contrast, the developed countries have long promoted the idea of stronger 
intellectual property protection throughout the world so as to improve incentives for private 
agents to create and advance technology and, not coincidentally, for their own inventors to 
extract greater returns from their discoveries.  A major part of this campaign has been an 
effort by developed countries to secure harmonization of patent systems across countries 
through bilateral, regional and international agreements, and they often contend that a 
strengthening of patent protection would be good even for developing societies, through 
stimulating more domestic production of inventions as well as by attracting more foreign 
direct investment to them.  Nonetheless, developing countries have been less than 
enthusiastic in embracing the argument that strong patent protection would have positive 
                                                 
1 Because intellectual property rights, such as patents, are granted on a country-by-country basis, each country 
establishes her own systems of intellectual property rights. In order to seek patent protection in different 
countries, inventors and/or firms need to take out patent application in these countries. Therefore, there is no 
so-called international patent. However, there are a number of international treaties to create a patent system 
which could be applied to several countries that join the treaties, such as the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty.    
2 Also, the U.S., a developing country of the 19th century, was regarded by Britain, as the leading intellectual 
pirate of that era for not providing copyright protection to non-U.S. residents. 2 
long-term effects on the rate of technological change and social welfare.  An increase in 
patent protection in developing countries may raise the prices (and the levels of royalties 
flowing out of the society) of goods and services produced with technologies developed 
abroad and decrease the rate of technological diffusion.  There is, moreover, little evidence 
supporting the view that stronger patent rights would stimulate inventive activity.  Divisions 
between developed and developing countries over intellectual property rights have, as a 
result, widened in recent years.    
Under pressure from developed countries and often in conjunction with concessions 
from them about opening up their domestic product markets to more imports, many 
developing countries have begun to strengthen their intellectual property systems, 
particularly as regards patents.  These changes in policy provide us with an opportunity to 
learn more about the effects of intellectual property institutions in developing countries. 
Whether and to what extent do stronger intellectual property rights spur inventive activity in 
a developing country?  What are the factors or characteristics of industries in which 
strengthening patent rights may have the most favorable impact on inventive activity?  Will 
the strengthening of IPR in developing countries induce more foreign direct investment and 
technology transfer from abroad?  Most prior empirical work on these issues has been 
devoted to the experiences in the developed world, and there has been only very limited 
study of what has happened in developing countries.  This paper, therefore, seeks to 
examine the effect of strengthening patent rights in a developing economy on her inventive 
activity by investigating the impact of the 1986 Taiwanese patent reforms.  
Under considerable pressure from the U.S., which had recently embarked on a 
campaign to secure better enforcement of intellectual property around the world, Taiwan 
made important changes to her patent system in 1986 that became effective in January 1987.  
As this new law imposed much more severe penalties, allowed patent holders to obtain 
much higher compensation through civil suits for infringement, and permitted Taiwan’s 
judicial system to establish a special court to handle patent litigation, the reforms were 
mainly centered on improving enforcement of patent rights in Taiwan.  This sudden policy 
shift provides an unusual natural experiment that allows one to study the impact on 
inventive activity in a developing country of strengthening patent protection.     3 
Following previous scholars, I use both patent statistics as well as information on 
expenditures of R&D to gauge inventive activity.
3  The use of the two types of measures 
should help in distinguishing between the effects of stronger patent protection on the 
propensity to patent an invention and on the investment in inventive activity (a well known 
issue among those that rely on patent counts).  Moreover, because I employ records of U.S. 
patents as well as of Taiwan patents, awarded to residents of Taiwan, there are even more 
ways of examining the robustness of findings; the series of U.S. patents offers the 
advantages of being less likely to be distorted by changes both in the propensity to patent, 
and of pertaining to inventions that are likely of much higher average market value than 
those patented in Taiwan.
4  This latter approach of exploiting patent series granted in the 
U.S. allows me to distinguish between changes in the propensity to patent and in actual 
changes in inventive output, and seems quite appropriate for this case.
5  As almost half of 
Taiwan’s exports during the 1980s were shipped to the U.S. and the U.S. has been Taiwan’s 
largest trading partner for decades, Taiwanese inventors and companies have long sought 
patent protection in the U.S. for technologies employed in products that are exported.
6  
Furthermore, because no dramatic patent policy shifts took place in the U.S. around the time 
of the 1986 Taiwanese patent reforms, the propensity of Taiwanese inventors to patent their 
inventions in the U.S. seems unlikely to have been altered.  The record of patenting in the 
U.S. by residents of Taiwan, therefore, seems to provide a better gauge of their actual record 
of inventive activity over time than the record of patenting by Taiwanese at home.  For this 
reason, in addition to using patent data from the Taiwanese Intellectual Property Office, I 
study the record of U.S. patents awarded to Taiwanese so as to better estimate the impact of 
the 1986 reforms on the country’s inventive activity.
7 
The evidence on the number of patents awarded to Taiwanese inventors, as well as 
that on R&D spending in Taiwan, suggest that the 1986 Taiwanese patent reforms 
stimulated additional inventive activity, especially in industries where patent protection is 
                                                 
3 See Griliches (1990, 1994) for a detailed discussion on prior work and the issues associated with using patent 
records to measure inventive activity.   
4 Patenting might be also affected by a change in the quality of patent examination. 
5 Prior studies on investigating inventive activity in countries other than the U.S., such as Trajtenberg (1999) 
and Qian(2003), often employ U.S. patent records awarded to residents of the countries of interest as a gauge 
of inventive activity. However, it is unclear why they do so.   
6 As shown in later sections, not only has the Taiwanese export sector intensively sought for patent protection 
in the U.S., but the domestic-oriented industries have also received a large number of U.S. patents.  
7 I included inventors and assignees who register addresses in Taiwan.  4 
generally regarded as an effective strategy for extracting returns from technological 
discoveries, and in industries which are more R&D intensive.  The reforms also seemed to 
encourage investment from abroad.  On the other hand, for industries that chiefly use other 
mechanisms to extract returns from their innovations, such as secrecy and lead time 
advantages, the strengthening of patent rights associated with the 1986 reforms had little 
effect on their inventive activity.  Neither investment in R&D nor the number of patents 
awarded in these industries were much affected by the strengthening of patent protection.   
I organize the rest of the paper as follows.  Section 2 outlines the different views 
towards patent systems and reviews prior empirical work regarding the impact of patent 
systems on invention.  Section 3 explains in detail the hypotheses and how I plan to test 
them.  Section 4 reviews what the Taiwanese patent system was like before the 1986 
reforms, as well as the background and substance of the change in patent protection.   
Section 5 describes the data.  The empirical analysis and results are presented in section 6.  
Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the policy implications to be derived from the 
findings.  
2. BACKGROUND 
The effectiveness of patent systems has long been of concern to economists and 
policy makers.  Indeed, the effects of patent systems were hotly debated and continuously 
under scrutiny in many European countries during the second half of the 19
th century.  Even 
in the U.S., which has historically been the staunchest of proponents, there have been several 
serious movements for reform.  Supporters of stronger patent rights have consistently 
argued for them on the grounds that stronger patent protection preserves incentives to 
invent, and thus benefit society as a whole.  The opponents of patents, on the other hand, 
contend that patents are often harmful.  They argue that patent rights are often not an 
effective mechanism for inventors to extract returns from their discoveries, sometimes 
award property rights for inventions that would have been discovered anyway, and 
frequently slow the pace of technological diffusion by preventing others from taking 
advantage of new technological knowledge.  Thus, strict patent systems can stifle invention 
and even technological progress. Perhaps influenced by these latter arguments, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland are among the countries that did not have any 
patent system (during the 19
th century), and did rather well.   5 
Even though patent systems have come to be widely adopted around the world, the 
debate has continued.  Scholars, such as Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000), have 
recently sought to address the fundamental issue of whether or not patents are an effective 
means for inventors to extract returns from their inventions.  Working with surveys they 
conducted of R&D facilities in the U.S. manufacturing sector, they find that firms, in 
practice, employ not only patents but also a wide range of other mechanisms, such as 
maintaining secrecy, to secure the income streams generated by their discoveries.  Indeed, 
the strategy of relying on secrecy is widespread across virtually all sectors, while patents are 
considered effective in only a handful of industries, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals.  
In addition to such empirical studies of the effectiveness of patent protection, contemporary 
theorists (for example, Tandon (1982), Gilbert and Shapiro (1991), Klemperer (1990), Gallini 
(1992) and Denicolo (1996)) have considered the problem of optimal patent design.  They 
have focused primarily on the interplay between the duration and the breadth of patent 
grants in providing an inventor appropriate incentives to invent, however, and devoted only 
limited attention to issues of enforcement or to questions related to harmonizing the patent 
systems of quite disparate economies.      
There have been some attempts to empirically investigate whether the existence of 
patent systems, or the particular design of a system, influences the rate or direction of 
inventive activity.  But such studies have, thus far, dealt with experiences in developed 
countries (for example, Kortum and Lerner (1998); Hall and Ziedonis (2001); Sakakibara and 
Branstetter (2001); Moser (2001)).  In general, they have found only small effects on the 
overall level of invention.  One problem with these studies is that the policy shifts in, or 
variation across, patent systems being exploited by the investigators seem less than 
exogenous.  Moreover, given that the contemporary policy debates center on the advisability 
of strengthening patent rights in developing countries, another concern is that the changes in 
the patent systems of developed countries being evaluated, or the circumstances of those 
economies more generally, may not be representative of conditions in less developed 
societies.  While developing countries may be abundant in labor and/or natural resources, 
they are in general lacking in capital, human capital and, most importantly, technological 
knowledge, which are critical elements for invention.
8  The disparity between developing and 
                                                 
8 See Sutthiphisal (2003) for more details. 6 
developed countries in technological knowledge, in particular, may mean that the response 
of populations in the former to strengthened patent rights might be very different from the 
response of populations that are more educated and familiar with the frontiers of 
technology.   
Indeed, in many less-developed countries, the great majority of patents go to foreign 
inventors from a small number of advanced countries.  The stark contrasts in the availability 
of factors important in inventive activity, as well in the records of invention, surely play a 
role in explaining why public opinion in less developed countries does not, in general, 
support stronger intellectual property institutions.  The perception that because their nations 
are poor, they are justified in freely learning and borrowing from the stock of technical 
knowledge that has been built up, is powerful and pervasive.  The popular appeal of this 
notion, and the not unrelated fact that there is a clear benefit to technology-importing 
countries of not having to pay royalties to foreign patent holders, could in principle account 
for developing countries failing to strengthen patent rights even if domestic invention would 
be boosted by the regime change.    
Several authors, such as Lanjouw (1998), Lanjouw and Cockburn (2000), and Qian 
(2003), have sought to explore the effects of changes in patent systems in developing-
country contexts.  However, these studies are exclusively focused on the introduction of 
pharmaceutical patents, and their findings of no significant evidence of causality running 
from the introduction of new patent laws to domestic invention may not extend to other 
industries.  Given the fact that successful R&D in pharmaceuticals typically requires 
workforces with highly specialized human capital and substantial investments in resources, 
very few developing countries would have the capacity and inclination to carry out 
significant inventive activity in this industry.  It is, therefore, not clear that studies that are 
based on pharmaceutical patent data would yield much general insight into the issue of 
whether stronger or broader patent protection would spur invention in developing countries.  
Lerner (2002) has studied all significant patent reforms around the world over a period of 
150 years.  His analysis is based on snapshots of the patent system in each country every 25 
years for the 150-year period. While the study provides some evidence that stronger patent 
rights are associated with inventive activity, the findings have no clear indication of the 
causal relationship between invention and patent rights.      7 
Inspired by the contemporary debates on whether stricter enforcement of patent 
rights would benefit less-developed countries, this paper differs from the previous empirical 
studies, which typically look at the experience of the developed world, in a number of 
respects.  First, my study focuses on a change in the patent institutions of a developing 
country, Taiwan, which was induced by sudden and external pressure.  Second, given that 
little empirical work has done on patent enforcement, I pay special attention to the effects of 
an increase in patent enforcement on inventive activity.  Fortunately, the primary thrust of 
the Taiwanese patent reforms was to improve the enforcement of patent rights.  Third, the 
study employs a variety of alternative measures of inventive activity in a close examination of 
the record of invention across a broad range of industries, before and after the enactment of 
the reforms.  Given the relatively exogenous and unexpected change in patent regime, there 
is good reason to believe that any association between the reforms and the changes in 
inventive activity that followed would stem largely from a causal relationship.  My approach 
should, accordingly, deliver rather direct evidence on the effects of strengthening patent 
protection in developing countries.  
3. HYPOTHESIS 
In the view of patent advocates, stronger patent rights tend to deter or delay imitation 
and help inventors and/or firms realize returns to their investments in inventive activity.  
The resulting increase in the expected return to investment in inventive activity, in turn, 
leads to increase in such investment.  If this perspective applies in a developing country, 
such as Taiwan, we should expect the 1986 reform of the patent law to lead to increases in 
R&D, patent applications, as well as in patent grants on inventions generated in Taiwan.  On 
the other hand, stronger patent rights could in principle discourage potential inventors from 
working with, and possibly improving upon, already patented inventions.  If so, there might 
actually be less invention after patent rights were strengthened.  Another, and perhaps more 
important reason why the change in patent law might not stimulate an increase in inventive 
activity is that the conditions in Taiwan were sufficiently unfavorable to boosting effective 
incentive that the change in the law could not have much of a positive effect.  
Of course, one would expect that the effects of strengthening patent protection on 
inventive activity to vary across industries.  There are two different, if not mutually exclusive, 
reasons why, and to what extent, industries might respond differently to a strengthening of 8 
patent protection.  First, because patent rights are granted on a country-by-country basis, an 
increase in patent protection in an economy such as Taiwan may have a stronger impact on 
an industry that chiefly targets the domestic market than an industry that focuses on foreign 
markets since the patent policy change applies only within Taiwan.  The investments in 
R&D by firms focusing on foreign markets might be expected to depend more on the ability 
to secure property rights on new technology in those markets.  Because a large amount of 
Taiwan’s exports were shipped to the U.S. in the 1980s and because the U.S. patent system 
provided strong patent rights, firms that targeted foreign markets should patent the fruits of 
their R&D investments through the U.S. patent system.  If this intuition held, one might 
expect to observe the biggest impact of the patent reforms on the domestic-oriented 
industries.  Second, a strengthening of patent rights might only affect inventive activity in 
industries in which patent protection were critical to extract returns from R&D.  Given that 
patents are not the only means to protect inventions and some industries may employ 
different mechanisms to secure returns from their inventions, a change in the patent system, 
therefore, might not have the same impact across industries.  For example, both Levin et al. 
(1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) find that while firms in chemical and pharmaceutical sectors 
consider patents as an effective mechanism to secure the income stream from their 
inventions, other industries tend to employ other means, such as keeping their 
improvements in technology secret.  As a result, the effects of strengthening patent 
protection should be more pronounced in industries that are more reliant upon patent 
protection than industries that chiefly rely on other mechanisms to protect the returns to 
their inventions. 
4. PATENT SYSTEM IN TAIWAN 
Patent System before the 1986 Reforms: 
Like patent laws in many developing countries, Taiwan’s patent system was designed 
not only to increase the incentive to invest in inventive activity, but also to promote 
economic development through encouraging technological diffusion within the country and 
technology acquisition from abroad.
9  The latter goal meant that the early patent laws were 
                                                 
9 Taiwan enacted a comprehensive patent law to improve industrial property rights in 1949. According to the 
law, there are three types of patents an inventor might be able to obtain on her invention: an invention patent, 
a new utility model patent, or a new design patent.   An invention patent, which during that time covered a 
term of 15 years from its issue date, is comparable to an American utility patent, which emphasizes the 9 
not geared for strict enforcement and did not offer broad coverage.  For instance, patent 
protection did not apply to agricultural and extractive industries until a revision to the patent 
law in 1979.
10  Indeed, the 1949 law defined patentable inventions in such narrow terms that 
patent protection was only available to manufactured products and manufacturing 
processes.
11  Despite the fact that revisions to the patent law took place in 1959, 1960 and 
1979, patent protection was not provided for chemicals and pharmaceuticals until the 1986 
reforms.     
Moreover, the generous compulsory licensing provisions of the old Taiwanese patent 
laws were also viewed by the U.S. and other developed countries as a salient example of lax 
intellectual property protection in Taiwan.  As compulsory licensing provisions enable a 
government to permit other parties to utilize patented technologies with remuneration, 
developing countries often employ this mechanism to ensure affordable access to medicines 
and other products deemed necessities; Taiwan was not exceptional in this regard.   
According to Taiwan’s 1979 patent law
12, a patent holder might be subject to a compulsory 
license not only in a case of national emergency, but also when she did not actually work her 
patented invention in Taiwan within three years of the granting of the patent.  However, the 
rapid economic development in Taiwan during 1970s and 1980s led the U.S. to urge the 
Taiwanese government to weaken the compulsory licensing policies.  
Another major deficiency, perhaps the one of greatest concern to the U.S., was the 
limited attention to enforcement of patent rights.  The penalties and liabilities specified for 
infringement were quite modest.  For example, under Taiwan’s 1979 patent law
13, a patent 
holder pursuing civil action for infringement could only recover the amount of damages 
estimated by the Taiwanese Patent Office, rather than the triple damages generally provided 
under the systems of developed countries.  The criminal provisions of the law also failed to 
provide much protection.  Under the 1979 law, the maximum fine for infringing on a patent 
right was as little as 40,000 New Taiwan dollars (approximately $1,300).   
                                                                                                                                                 
functional and operational characteristics of an invention.  A Taiwanese new design patent, similar to the U.S. 
design patent, protects the shape, pattern, appearance or artistic features of an article.  The in-between type 
known as the new utility model grants protection on the form, structure or fitting.  The new design patents 
under the law expired in 5 years and the new utility model patents had a span of 10 years.  
10 Article 1 of the 1979 Taiwan Patent Law. 
11 Article 1 of the 1949 Taiwan Patent Law. 
12 Article 67-69 of the 1979 Taiwan patent law. 
13 Article 82 of the 1979 Taiwan patent law. 10 
For both of these reasons, before the 1986 reforms, Taiwan’s patent system provided 
quite modest protection to property rights in new technological information.   
The Background to The 1986 Taiwanese Patent Reforms: 
By the 1980s, many firms in the U.S. (as well as in other developed countries) had 
become extremely concerned that they were being undercut by competitors who not only 
benefited from locating production in developing countries with low labor costs, but who 
were also infringing their intellectual property rights (as embodied in trademarks as well as 
patents).  These firms began to feel that they were suffering substantial losses because of a 
lack of intellectual property protection abroad.  The American general public also grew 
anxious that the U.S. lead in hi-tech industries would be eroded rapidly if these 
circumstances continued.  In order to maintain their competitive edge, many American 
companies, together with the U.S. government initiated a campaign to secure reforms of 
intellectual property right systems (focused particularly on patents) throughout the world.  
The views of Clayton Yeutter, the U.S. trade representative from 1985 to 1989, are 
representative: 
The pirating of U.S.-financed research and development discourages innovation, denies 
markets to American exports, and threatens technological progress. Protection of 
intellectual property rights preserves America’s technological edge, which is a key to our 
continued international competitiveness.14   
This atmosphere was certainly reflected in U.S. trade policies.  In 1984, the U.S. began 
to treat inadequate protection of intellectual property rights as an unfair trade practice by 
other countries.  Countries that failed to provide adequate intellectual property protection, 
thereby damaging U.S. businesses, were to be made subject to U.S. retaliation under Section 
301 of the 1974 Trade Act.   
Because of Taiwan’s deficient intellectual property rights system, piracy was a 
widespread phenomenon, and many U.S. businesses had been wounded by these imitators.    
When Pfizer Inc. of New York introduced an arthritis drug in Taiwan four years ago, 
local manufacturers flooded the market with capsules that looked exactly like Pfizer’s 
turquoise-and-maroon Feldeanes. The company says that within a year it had 20 
competitors and within two years it held less than a 30% market share. Last year Pfizer’s 
share slipped to 18%.15 
                                                 
14 The quotaion is from Alison Butler, “The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: What Is at 
Statke?” 
15 The Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1985, p. 37. 11 
Moreover, Taiwanese pirating was not just a domestic matter.  Copycat products from 
Taiwan flooded export markets all over the world during the early 1980s.   
For now, at least, Taiwan is to counterfeiting what Miami is to drug trafficking….The 
United States International Trade Commission, for example, estimates that fake goods 
cost American Businesses $6 billion in 1982 and that 60 percent of the bogus products 
were made in Taiwan….Counterfeiting is a problem common to most developing 
countries. But Taiwan is distinguished by the wide rage of products it manufactures and 
by the large amount of the output that it exports.16 
Consequently, by the 1980s Taiwan was – after Japan in the 1960s and Hong Kong in the 
1970s – the counterfeiting and illegal-copying capital of the world.  
Taiwan, however, enjoyed a substantial bilateral trade surplus with the U.S. in the 
1980s and was U.S. fifth largest trading partner.  As a result, Taiwan was one of the first 
three countries put on the U.S. priority watch for their lack of intellectual property 
protection.
17   
The 1986 Taiwanese Patent Reforms: 
In 1985 and 1986, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs and the U.S. Trade 
Representative began a series of talks concerning the protection of intellectual property 
rights in Taiwan.  As a result of these talks, a comprehensive new patent law was submitted 
to the Yuan (Taiwan’s supreme legislature) in December 1986, so as to bring the law into 
accord with the recommendations of the U.S. Trade Representative.  The amended law was 
finally enacted and promulgated on December 24, 1986, and came into force in January 
1987.   
Perhaps the most obvious change introduced by the new law was an expansion of 
patent coverage.  Not only did patent protection extend to the pharmaceutical and chemical 
industries, but new plant varieties and microorganisms could also be patented.  However, the 
crucial feature of the new regime was the emphasis on improved enforcement of patent 
rights.  For example, the new law enforced more stringent requirements before compulsory 
licensing could be imposed.  In addition, because many district courts did not have the 
proficiency and specialized knowledge appropriate for patent litigation, the new law 
stipulated the creation of a new court that would exclusively focus on patent infringement. 
                                                 
16 The New York Times, May 7, 1985, p. D12. 
17 In October 1986, the U.S. also accused South Korea for her inadequate protection on intellectual property  
rights while Japan along with Taiwan was charged in November 1986.   12 
The new law also sought to enhance patent protection through increased penalties and 
expanded liability for patent infringement.  According to the new criminal penalty schedule, 
the maximum fine for infringing an invention patent was raised to 100,000 New Taiwan 
dollars ($3,300).  Most importantly, the reforms substantially increased the compensation 
that patent holders could realize through civil actions.  Before the reforms, the damages of a 
patentee could only be estimated by the patent office.  The new patent system allowed two 
other ways to determine the damages.  Under the new law, the damages could also be 
estimated as the profits lost by the patent holder, or as the infringer’s profits made from the 
infringed article.  Moreover, in case the patent holder suffers damage on her business 
reputation as a result of the infringement, a separate compensation of up to three times the 
actual damage would be available.  The government also introduced a wide range of 
administrative measures to curb piracy and counterfeiting, such as withdrawing violators’ 
credits from government-owned banks, and it soon after launched a campaign against 
infringement.  Rapid growth in the number of both patent opposition and anti-
counterfeiting cases, as shown in Figure 1, seems to support the view that the reforms 
substantially strengthened the enforcement of patents due to the largely exogenous pressure 
from the U.S.
18 
One concern which this study must address is that there are many mechanisms and 
institutions, other than the design of the patent system, which a government can employ to 
influence the rate or direction of inventive activity.  Such mechanisms and institutions 
include – but are not limited to – R&D tax subsidies, governmental and semi-governmental 
research institutes, and support for venture capital institutions.  To address this concern, I 
examined the record of other Taiwanese laws, statutes and Acts concerning R&D, as well as 
the histories of Taiwan’s important research institutes and science-based industrial park.  I 
found no significant change in these policies around the 1986 reforms.  Consequently, the 
sudden shift of patent policy in 1986 provides an unusual natural experiment for the study of 
the impact of strengthening patent rights in a developing country. 
                                                 
18 Any person who asserts that a published invention has violated any requirements, stipulated in the patent 
law, of granting a patent, may, within three months from the publication date, submit a written opposition 
application. Upon receipt of a written opposition, the patent office shall re-examine the issued patent. 
(Translated from Chinese to English by the Taiwanese Intellectual Property Office and posted on the page of 
its website http://www.tipo.gov.tw/eng/laws/laws.asp) 13 
5. THE DATA 
Similar to a large volume of prior empirical work on invention and technological 
progress such as the pioneering work of Schmookler (1966), Pakes and Griliches (1980), 
Sokoloff (1988) and Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2003), I employ patent statistics to measure 
inventive activity.  However, a strengthening of patent rights may not only change the level 
of inventive activity but also affect the willingness of an inventor to obtain a patent.  An 
increase or a decrease in the number of patent applications, and thereby the number of 
grants after a patent reform, may not be due solely to a change in inventive activity.  One 
must be careful to distinguish between an increase in patenting due to an increase in 
invention, and an increase that arises from a change in the propensity to patent an invention 
in the country that has recently reformed her patent institutions.    
So as to more effectively deal with this measurement problem, I focus on the 
patenting of Taiwanese residents in the U.S.  Because the export volume to the U.S. market 
accounted for one half of Taiwan’s total exports in the late 1970s and 1980s and still about 
one fourth today, many Taiwanese have long sought patent protection on their discoveries in 
the U.S.
19  Because there were no changes in the U.S. system around 1986 and 1987 and 
because the changes in the counts of Taiwanese patents awarded to her residents might 
reflect both changes in inventive effort and in propensity to patent, the record of U.S. 
patents granted to residents of Taiwan seems to provide a better gauge.   
Patent Data 
Accordingly, I collected patent data for my empirical analysis from two different 
sources: the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) online patent grant databases and 
the Taiwan Patent Network (TPN) searchable database on Taiwanese patents.
20  The 
USPTO database contains all patents granted in the U.S. since 1790, and the TPN patent 
database also provides a search engine that is comparable to that for the U.S.  As the 
purpose of this paper is to investigate the consequences of the 1986 Taiwanese patent 
reforms, my U.S. patent data set includes all of the U.S. patents awarded to inventors and 
assignees in Taiwan from 1983 to 1991.  There are a total of 5,983 patents.  For each patent, 
                                                 
19 Not only the export but also non-export sectors of Taiwan have patented many of their inventions in the 
U.S.   
20 The URL address of USPTO is www.uspto.gov and that of TPN is www.twpat.com.  14 
I record its patent number, subject, date of issue, the name and address of the inventor, the 
assignee at issue and her address, the date of application, the current U.S. classification, the 
international patent classification, and the number of claims.
21   
As I intend to examine the effect of the reforms not only on overall inventive activity 
but also on the composition of invention across industries, I categorized these 5,983 patents 
into 25 different industries by reading their abstracts, claims, and drawings.  A close 
examination is necessary because patent classification is based on the specific function of the 
invention.  For example, under the standard industrial classification (SIC), a sprayer for 
agricultural use is classified in farm and garden machinery and equipment.  An atomizer for 
medical use is classified into surgical, medical, and dental instruments and supplies.   
However, under the U.S. patent classification, both of them are categorized into class 239 – 
fluid sprinkling, spraying, and diffusion.  Table 1 summarizes the numbers of granted patents 
filed by or assigned to Taiwanese residents between 1982 and 1991 across these 25 different 
industries.   
In addition to the U.S. patent data set, I construct another data set from the TPN 
online database by collecting all the patents issued by the Taiwanese Intellectual Property 
Office (before 1999 called the National Bureau of Standards) between 1984 and 1991.  This 
dataset consists of 130,268 patents and contains similar bibliographic information on patents 
to that in the USPTO database.  Among these 130,286 patents, 66,537 patents are awarded 
to residents of Taiwan.    
The huge gap between the numbers of patents awarded to Taiwanese residents in the 
two patent systems might seem peculiar, but a part of the discrepancy is the result of the 
higher cost for inventors to file a patent application in the U.S. compared to Taiwan.  From 
my interviews with patent agents working in Taiwan, on average it costs about $1,000 to file 
a Taiwanese patent application through patent agents or attorneys in Taiwan.
22  However, 
because the requirements for filing a patent application in the U.S. are quite different from 
those in Taiwan, it is considered a separate task for patent agents to assist an inventor to file 
the U.S. application.  Indeed, some firms even hire different patent agents to apply for 
                                                 
21 An assignee is a person or an organization to which the rights of a patent have been assigned.  
22 The costs might be higher with the increased complexity of the invention. 15 
patents in the two countries.  The cost can be up to $3,000 to $4,000 per U.S. patent 
application, and even higher if an inventor hires American patent agents.     
From these 130,286 patents, I randomly selected a sample of 5,277 patents, 2,725 of 
which are awarded to Taiwanese inventors.  Table 2 reports the distribution of 2,725 granted 
patents across the 25 industries.   
In order to compare the patterns of patents awarded to Taiwanese inventors with the 
patterns of patents granted to inventors residing in other countries that did not undergo 
patent reforms (such as Israel and Singapore), I also obtained information on U.S. patents 
awarded to residents of foreign countries from the technology reports of the USPTO 
Technology Assessment and Forecast branch. 
R&D Data 
In addition to the patent records, I obtained Taiwan’s estimates of industrial R&D 
from the yearly Indicators of Science and Technology, 1991-2001, published by the Taiwan 
National Science Council.  Each year since 1983, the National Science Council has 
conducted the “Survey of National Science and Technology Activity”, and their reports 
contain information on annual spending and manpower by industries.
23 
24  
Other Data  
In addition to patent protection, inventive activity might be affected by many other 
factors such as business cycles and other industrial policies.  Hence, it is critical to control 
for the effects of these factors.  From the online economic database provided by Taiwan’s 
Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics, I collected annual series on 
industrial production from 1981 to 1992, and obtained export figures from the Monthly 
Statistics of Exports and Imports, published by Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance.
25  Information 
on foreign direct investment is from the Statistical Yearbook on Overseas Chinese & 
                                                 
23 The survey population includes all colleges and universities, all public and private research institutes, all state-
owned enterprises and a sample of private corporations in Taiwan. While firms in the Hsinchu science-base 
industrial park are all included in the sample, other private companies are randomly selected from “The 
Industrial Statistical Survey” conducted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.        
24 From the survey questionnaire, figures on R&D spending appear to be net of research and technology 
import payment, inclusive of technological cooperation, of technology licensing (on patents, trademarks, 
software, databanks and etc.) and of technology instruction (such as technical training, consulting, and 
technology assistance).  
25 Export values are F.O.B. (freight on board) 16 
Foreign Investment, Technical Cooperation Outward, Technical Cooperation, Indirect 
Mainland Investment, Guide of Mainland Industry Technology, 1996, the Republic of China.  
Although I classify the 5,983 U.S. patents and the 2,725 Taiwanese patents awarded to 
residents of Taiwan into 25 industries, annual information on R&D expenditures, exports 
and production values is not available for all of the 25 industries (simply because the 
Taiwanese government does not report survey and statistics figures in that type of detail).  In 
order to match the information on R&D and production with my patent data, I removed 
those patents classified into both the construction and the miscellaneous manufacturing 
industries categories and grouped the rest into 10 major sectors.  The new law took effect in 
1987, my period of observation starts in 1984 and ends in 1991.  The distributions of patents 
after removing two industries and grouping the remaining 23 industries into the 
abovementioned 10 industries are reported in Table 3 and Table 4.     
6. EFFECTS OF THE 1986 REFORM ON TAIWAN’S INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 
In Section 3 I presented several hypotheses regarding the effects of the 1986 patent 
reforms on Taiwan’s domestic inventive activity.  In short, if the strengthening of patent 
rights was expected to help Taiwanese inventors extract greater returns from their 
inventions, then we should observe increases over the previous trend in expenditures on 
R&D, in patent applications, as well as in patent grants on inventions generated in Taiwan 
after the reforms.  Moreover, as the effects of strengthening patent protection on inventive 
activity should vary across industries, we would expect them to be more prominent in those 
industries where patent protection was technically most feasible (that is, where competitors 
could not easily invent around the patent or imitate without being detected).  Moreover, 
because the patent reforms applied to the enforcement of Taiwanese patents, the impact of 
the strengthening of patent protection on inventive activity should be stronger in industries 
targeting the domestic market than in industries focusing on foreign markets which have 
their own strong patent systems.  In this section, I subject these hypotheses to tests of 
consistency with the data.   
Overall Inventive Activity 
If the Taiwanese patent reforms induced greater domestic inventive activity in general, 
we should observe an increase in R&D efforts in or around the year when the reforms came 17 
into force.  Figure 2 graphs the total R&D spending of these 10 major sectors around the 
time of the 1986 patent reforms which took effect in 1987.  While the R&D expenditures 
were rather flat between 1983 and 1986, an abrupt increase took place in 1987 and grew 
rapidly thereafter.  Because inventive activity may simply expand along with production, 
Figure 3 reveals that the same qualitative pattern holds for R&D spending as a proportion of 
industrial production.  If the effect was only temporary, then the time trend of R&D 
spending should exhibit a spike in or around 1987.  On the other hand, if the effect was 
long-term, then the time path should instead show a marked increase around 1987 and stay 
at a high level afterwards.  Plots of R&D spending, as shown in Figure 2 and 3, suggest that 
the reforms might have long-term effects.   
While the reforms seem to have encouraged greater investments in R&D, it is not so 
easy to discern whether the reforms had a major effect on the number of patents awarded to 
residents of Taiwan, to say nothing of the actual rate at which they generated new 
technological knowledge.  Patenting grew rapidly in the U.S. and in Taiwan both just prior to 
as well as after 1987.  Figure 4 displays the annual counts of patents awarded to Taiwanese 
inventors in the U.S. and in Taiwan, as reported in the last row, total, in Tables 3 and 4 
respectively.  No obvious increase above trend around 1987 is visible in these aggregate 
counts.  Also, as the reforms only applied within Taiwan, one might expect that the growth 
rate of the number of patents awarded to Taiwanese residents by the Taiwanese Patent 
Office should outnumber that granted by USPTO to residents of Taiwan owing to the 
strengthening of patent rights which would have increased the propensity to patent in 
Taiwan.  With such an expectation, it is puzzling that the number of U.S. patents granted to 
Taiwanese inventors grew more rapidly than the number of Taiwanese patents going to 
Taiwanese inventors.     
In order to explore the effects of the reforms on patenting in a more systematic and 
detailed manner, I estimate a series of regressions.  In these regressions, I employ two 
measures of inventive activity – R&D spending and patent counts – as the primary 
dependent variables.
26  To control for the increase in inventive activity that stems merely 
from the expansion of production, the annual figures on R&D spending and patent counts 
                                                 
26 A large body of prior empirical literature on technological progress considers R&D expenditures as a major 
input of inventive activity while patents are widely regarded as a measure of invention output.    18 
are deflated for each industry by its production value in the respective year, and expressed in 
a natural log scale.
27  Among the independent variables included in the specifications are: (i) 
time trend or year dummies;  (ii) the export intensity of each industry, measured by the 
natural log of the ratio of exports to production value; and (iii) a term for the R&D intensity 
of each industry
28, measured in the same way as exports intensity, lagged one year; (iv) 
industry dummy variables to control for differences across industries in factors such as the 
returns to inventive activity and/or the propensity to extract returns from new technology 
through obtaining patent rights.
 29  Most importantly, in order to capture the effect of the 
reforms, I incorporate a dummy variable, reform, or interaction terms between “reform” and 
industry dummies.  The dummy variable, reform, takes a value of 0 in years before 1987 and 1 
afterwards. 
I begin with my analysis by examining the effects of the reforms on R&D spending.  I 
applied a fixed effects model across industries while controlling for export intensity and year 
effects.  If the reforms stimulated increased investments in R&D spending relative to the 
level of production in the respective industry, then the coefficients on the year dummies 
around 1987 should be positive.  The regression results, as reported in Table 5, seem to 
suggest that the reforms induced additional R&D expenditures.  To visualize the effects of 
the reforms, I plot the time pattern of these estimated year coefficients in Figure 6.  If there 
was only a temporary effect of the reforms, then one would expect only a spike at 1987 or 
just afterwards.  Given that the coefficients remain consistently positive, substantial in 
magnitude, and generally statistically significant, the effects of the reforms seem more likely 
to have been long-term.     
I then look at the effects of the reforms on the total number of patents.  The 
regressions presented here employ the log of patents (awarded by USPTO and by the 
Taiwanese Patent Office respectively) awarded by industry over the level of production 
(production value) as the dependent variable, and add a term for a one-year-lag of R&D 
intensity to the other covariates used above.  As reported in Table 6, the estimated 
                                                 
27 Actually the measure is equal to log [(patent count + 1)/production] because in some years, some industries 
did not generate any patented invention. 
28 I compute R&D intensity of each industry as the share of R&D spending over production value.   
29 I use a test proposed by Mackinnon, White, and Davidson (1983) to validate my choice of a log-linear 
regression model over a linear one. I applied the test to all my regression specifications. As the majority of test 
statistics tend to reject the use of the linear forms and indeed some of them do reject, the result seems to 
support my choice of log-linear forms over linear ones.  19 
coefficients are consistently positive and statistically significant for the year-dummies from 
1987 on in the regression pertaining to U.S. patents, but – although generally positive – they 
are smaller and do not quite attain conventional standards of significance except in 1991 for 
the regression based on patents in Taiwan.  The patterns of coefficients on the year-dummy 
variables are displayed in Figure 7 for the convenience of the reader.  Again, the impact of 
reforms seems to have been much larger when gauged by U.S. patents awarded to Taiwanese 
residents than by patents granted by the Taiwanese Patent Office.   
A possible reason may explain why we observe these conflicting results.  Taiwanese 
residents may be generating increasingly valuable or higher-quality inventions over time, 
allowing a higher fraction of them to pass the more stringent U.S. patent examination.  To 
evaluate this possibility, Figure 5 plots the proportion of patent applications by Taiwanese 
residents that are granted.  The increase in the success of Taiwanese inventors in obtaining 
patents, in both regions, over the period seems to support the notion that they were 
discovering better or higher quality inventions over time.  As the total number of U.S. 
patents granted to residents of Taiwan was much smaller (though of higher quality on 
average) than those of Taiwanese patents awarded to Taiwanese inventors, an increase in the 
number of high-quality inventions by Taiwanese inventors would appear more salient in the 
U.S. patent series than in the Taiwanese series.  If the reforms had a disproportionate 
influence on high-quality inventions, the sort that inventors might want to obtain patent 
rights for everywhere, and U.S. patents granted to Taiwanese were on average of higher 
quality or value, then one could indeed explain why the Taiwanese patent counts grew more 
slowly than the U.S. patent counts.
30  
                                                 
30 Another possibility is that along with the 1986 reforms, the Taiwanese Patent Office also adopted a few 
measures to improve the quality and efficiency of patent examination in 1987 and 1988.  In brief, the Patent 
Office allocated its patent examiners into eight different teams according to their specialties in order to 
improve the quality of examination as well as to shorten the processing time.  Also, given that each patent 
application is required to be examined twice by different examiners, under the new process of examination, 
junior examiners are chiefly responsible for the first round of examination and seniors re-examine them.  In 
addition, the Office cooperated with the Chinese National Federation of Industries, a nonprofit industrial 
organization, to create the first searchable patent records that allow researchers and examiners to search past 
patent grants by the international patent classification and thereby facilitate patent examination.  The more 
stringent patent examination, posed by the Taiwanese Patent Office around the time when the reform came 
into effect, might be another reason why the numbers of U.S. patents granted to Taiwanese inventors grew 
more rapidly than the numbers of Taiwanese patents going to Taiwanese inventors. 20 
Did the Effects of the Reform Vary across Industries and to What Extent?       
To further explore whether or not inventors and/or firms in different industries 
responded differently to the policy change, I consider two possibilities.  One is that the 
effects varied between industries that focused on the international market and those that 
were more oriented toward the domestic (Taiwan) market.  The logic here is that export-
oriented industries would be most concerned with whether they could enforce property 
rights to their technologies in the relevant foreign countries, and thus might not be so 
affected by changes in Taiwanese intellectual property institutions.  Domestic-oriented 
industries, on the other hand, would in principle be quite sensitive to the change in Taiwan’s 
laws.  Table 7 reports the ratios of exports to production values by industry over the period 
under study.  Four industries – food and tobacco, paper and publishing, industrial goods, 
and transportation equipment – stand out because of their low export intensities.  The other 
six industries exported almost, or more than, half of their output to foreign markets.    
In addition to categorizing industries into export- and domestic-oriented industries, 
one might expect that in general the higher R&D intensive an industry is, the stronger 
intellectual property systems it demands.  Table 8 reports the ratios of R&D expenditures to 
production values across industries over the period under study.  Based on the averages of 
the ratios, as reported in the last row of Table 8, I categorize wood and furniture as very low 
R&D intensive.  Food and tobacco, leather, textile and apparel, and paper and publishing 
were low R&D intensive industries. Industrial goods, instruments, and machinery were 
median R&D intensive industries, while electronic and electric, and transportation 
equipment sectors are the most R&D intensive industries.   
Figures 8 and 9 respectively graph the R&D spending and intensity of the two groups 
of industries – domestic-oriented and export-oriented.  Expenditures on R&D were more 
volatile in domestic-oriented industries than in industries that mainly targeted foreign 
markets, perhaps because domestic industries were more vulnerable to business cycles in 
Taiwan.  Nevertheless, the 1987 reforms seemed to have induced greater investment in R&D 
spending in both sets of industries.  I also plot the number of U.S. patents granted in these 
two groups of industries from 1984 to 1991, as shown in Figure 10.  Despite a slight decline 
in the number of patents in the four domestic-oriented industries awarded to Taiwanese 
inventors between 1987 and 1988, in general both sets of industries exhibited a marked 21 
increase in patenting in the U.S. after the reforms.  Eyeballing the trends in the data in this 
way seems to suggest that there was not much of a difference in how inventive activity 
responded to the reforms between these two sets of industries.  Moreover, as regards patent 
counts, there was no evident acceleration around 1987 in the rate of growth of U.S. patents 
in either set of industries.     
The other possibility considered here is that a strengthening of patent rights might 
only affect industries in which patent protection is critical to protect their inventions.   
Because firms may employ other mechanisms, such as secrecy and/or lead time, to extract 
returns from their discoveries, the importance of, and reliance on, patent protection may 
vary across industries.  For example, food and tobacco industries are widely known for their 
intensive use of secrecy to secure their income streams from their inventions.  The two 
industry sectors – textile and apparel, and leather industries, tend to rely more upon 
trademarks or lead time to protect their creations, while the paper and publishing sectors 
mainly employ strategies such as complementary sales and secrecy.  I therefore distinguish 
them (food and tobacco, textile and apparel, leather, and paper and publishing) as the set of 
industries that might not so heavily rely on patent protection, from the other six industries.  
The low patenting rates of these four industries both in the U.S. and in Taiwan, as reported 
in Tables 3 and 4, seem to support the notion that these industries were not heavily 
dependant on patent rights to protect inventions.  The other group, therefore, consists of 
the industrial sectors wood and furniture, industrial goods, transportation equipment, 
electronic and electric, machinery, and instruments.  
I start with examining the time patterns of the total R&D expenditures in these two 
groups of industries.  As shown in Figures 11 and 12, the total R&D spending of non-
patent-reliant industries exhibited a surge in 1987, declined significantly in 1988, and then 
rose again in 1990.  The other group of industries that are heavily reliant on patent 
protection, contrary-wise, had a rather flat level of R&D spending during 1983-1986, and 
significantly increased their R&D expenditure in later years.  Moreover, Figure 13 reveals a 
stark contrast on patenting trend in the U.S. between these two sets of industries.  While 
there was no significant change in the number of U.S. patents granted to the non-patent-
reliant industries, the number of patents received by industries in which patents are 
frequently used grew rapidly over time.  These plots, however, show no clear indication that 22 
the reforms had any effect on R&D expenditure and patenting of these two sets of 
industries.         
In order to more systematically examine the responses of inventive activity to the 
reforms, I undertook a set of regression analyses.  In some specifications, I, also include 
another set of dummy variables as independent variables to control for the difference in 
R&D intensities across industries.  The regressions in Table 9 use patents in the U.S. to 
gauge inventive activity while those in Table 10 pertain to variation in R&D spending.  Panel 
A in both tables explores the possibility that the impact of the reforms might vary across 
industries that targeted different geographic markets and Panel B, on the other hand, 
examines whether or not the responses to the reforms differed in the reliance of industries 
on patent rights to extract returns from their discoveries.   
As reported in Table 9, two basic results stand out from these regression analyses.  
First, a comparison of the regression results between the domestic- and export-oriented 
industries seems to suggest that there was little difference between the two sets of industries 
in the responses to the patent reforms.  The regression results between patent-reliant and 
non-patent-reliant industries also yield similar findings.  However, as the coefficients on the 
dummy variable, reform, and most of the interaction terms between reform and industry 
dummies are positive, though not statistically significant, the regressions seem to suggest that 
the 1986 patent reforms might have some effect, however weak, on overall patenting in the 
U.S.
31  A closer examination further suggested that the effects were particularly strong in 
industries that were highly R&D intensive, such as electronic and electric.  
To directly investigate the impact of the reform, regressions in Table 10 examine 
R&D expenditure.  The results, as reported in Panel A, seem to suggest that the reforms 
induced little R&D spending in general.  Moreover, domestic- and export-oriented industries 
did not appear to respond differently to the reform.  I then perform Chow tests on these 
two groups.  The tests yield small F statistics which lead me to reject the hypothesis that 
there exist differences between these two sets of industries in response to the reforms. 
                                                 
31 Because not all inventions are patentable and, moreover, not all patentable inventions are actually patented 
(since inventors and/or firms have other mechanisms to protect their inventions), perhaps the insignificant 
regression results depicted in Table 9 might be attributable to these limitations of patent data. 23 
On the contrary, by categorizing industries by their reliance on patent protection, the 
regressions show that the policy shift had a positive and statistically significant impact on 
patent-reliant industries, as reported in the first equation in Panel B.  The reforms, however, 
had little, if not a negative, effect on the set of industries where patent rights were not 
heavily relied on to extract returns from their inventions.   
In addition to the reported regressions, I employ the same specification as the first 
equation in Panel B to explore the possibilities: (i) inventors might have responded to the 
strengthening of patent rights prior to the reform or (ii) it might take a longer time for 
inventors to adjust to the new patent regime.  By varying the “year” of reform – either 
pushing back the “assumed” implementation year of the reform from 1987 to 1986 or 
shifting it forward to 1988 or 1989 – the regressions yield estimated coefficients on the 
dummy variable, reform, in a lesser magnitude which is no longer statistically significant.  The 
results thus support the fundamental assumption that the reform was exogenous.  The 
results also suggest that inventors responded to the new patent policy without a lag.     
To examine whether the effects of the reforms varied across industries further, I 
include in the regression the interaction terms between the R&D intensity dummy variables 
and  reform.  The results, as reported in the second equation in Panel B, show that the 
estimated coefficient on the interaction term between reform and the high R&D intensity 
dummy variable is positive and away from zero at the 0.01 significance level, suggesting that 
the reforms particularly stimulated R&D spending in industries that tend to heavily invest in 
R&D.  A closer look at the third equation in Panel B indicates that the reforms had the most 
favorable impact on R&D spending in transportation equipment, and electric and electronic 
industries.  In contrast, evidence in the last two columns of Panel B suggests that for 
industries that chiefly use other mechanisms to extract returns from their inventions, such as 
secrecy, the strengthening of patent rights had little effect on their inventive activity.  
The analyses preformed here imply that the reforms induced additional R&D 
spending on industries where patent protection is more likely to be relied on.  It is especially 
true in industries that were highly R&D intensive.  The policy shift also increased the 
number of U.S. patents awarded to Taiwanese inventors in the electronic and electric 
industry.  On the other hand, for industries that were not heavily dependent upon patent 24 
rights to secure returns from their discoveries, R&D spending and the numbers of patents 
awarded in these industries changed little from the period before to the period after. 
Did the Reform Bring about More Foreign Direct Investment?  
In addition to the direct effect on domestic invention, the advocates of stronger 
patent rights often argue that a strengthening of patent rights might attract more foreign 
direct investment and technology transfer from abroad.  There are several reasons for this 
conjecture.  First, because an enhancement in enforcement of patent rights increases the cost 
of domestic imitators to infringe patents, it reduces the chance that local competitors free 
ride on patented technology developed abroad.  Second, effective patent protection also 
reduces transaction costs such as contractual and monitoring expenses.
32  I n  o r d e r  t o  
advance our understanding of the effects of strengthening patent rights, I also examine the 
time pattern of foreign direct investment in Taiwan.    
As shown in Figure 14, the time path of foreign direct investment in Taiwan exhibited 
a surge in 1987 and remained at a relatively high level afterwards, which seems to support 
the idea that the reform promoted foreign direct investment.  Because the total amounts of 
foreign direct investment reported in Figure 14 are inclusive of investment made in service 
industries, to examine the impact of the reforms systematically, I look at investment made 
only in the ten manufacturing industries where I have investigated their patenting and 
expenditures on R&D earlier in this section.  Figure 15 reveals a similar pattern, although in 
a lesser degree, to Figure 14.  The findings imply that the reforms induced more investment 
from abroad.      
International Comparison 
The evidence, thus far, shows that the reforms had a strong impact on industries 
which are not only heavily reliant on patent rights to protect their invention, but also highly 
R&D intensive, such as the electronic and electric industries.  To explore the effects of the 
reforms further, I then compare the numbers of U.S. patents in some patent-reliant 
industries awarded to Taiwanese inventors with those awarded to residents of several other 
countries that had similar levels of technological practice and economic development to 
Taiwan but did not make significant changes in their patent systems in the 1980s, especially 
                                                 
32 See the third chapter of Maskus (2002) for details. 25 
in 1986 and 1987.  I also include South Korea, which made an equally dramatic change in its 
patent system in 1986 as a result of U.S. pressure.  The countries involved in the comparison 
are Argentina, Israel, Singapore, South Africa, and South Korea.   
Figures 16, 17, and 18 plot the number of U.S. patents granted respectively in the 
chemical, electric, and mechanical fields by year of patent application.  While the number of 
U.S. patents awarded in these industries to Argentina, Israel, Singapore and South Africa 
changed little from the early 1980s to early 1990s, patenting in the U.S. by Taiwanese and 
South Korean residents experienced rapid growth.  The evidence suggests that patent 
reforms did spur domestic inventive activity in Taiwan and South Korea, since the other 
four countries did not make changes in their patent regimes until much later. Indeed, in 
recent years, Taiwan has surpassed most OECD countries and has been the fourth largest 
recipient of U.S. patents, after the U.S., Japan and Germany.  South Korea also scores highly 
in this regard.   
7. CONCLUSION 
As the GATT and the WTO require member countries to accept and adhere to the 
1993 Trade Related Intellectual Property Agreement, in recent years developing countries 
have been restructuring their patent regimes to bring them more in line with those in 
industrialized countries.  The primary motivation of developed countries, such as the United 
States, that have pushed for the so-called harmonization of intellectual property regimes has 
no doubt been in their own interest.  However, some proponents of this recent policy trend 
toward strengthening patent protection argue that regardless of the background to the 
institutional change, stronger patent protection might actually stimulate domestic inventive 
activity in developing countries – if not enhance social welfare more generally.  The leaders 
of developing countries have generally reacted skeptically but have not always been able to 
stand up to the outside pressures.    
This paper has sought to improve our understanding of the impact of strengthening 
patent rights in a developing economy, by examining the effects of a change in the 
Taiwanese patent system, a change which was to a great extent compelled by pressure from 
the United States.  The empirical evidence supports the idea that the 1986 Taiwanese patent 
reforms stimulated inventive activity in Taiwan, as gauged both by expenditures on R&D 26 
and by patenting in the U.S.  It is especially true in industries that would normally be 
expected by the nature of their products to be more heavily reliant on patent protection to 
extract returns from their inventions.  Moreover, the more R&D intensive an industry was, 
the larger the impact of the reforms would be.  For industries that are normally considered 
less dependent on patent rights to realize returns to their new technologies or products, the 
reforms had little effect on either patenting or R&D expenditures.  In addition to the direct 
effects on domestic invention, there is evidence that the strengthening of patent rights also 
induced more foreign direct investment in Taiwan. 
Several policy implications can be drawn from these findings.  First, a stricter patent 
regime may benefit developing countries by spurring inventive activity and encouraging 
foreign direct investment.  However, the benefits from strengthening patent rights appear to 
vary across industries.  A similar policy change might, therefore, have different effects on 
countries since each country has its own unique composition of industries.  As patent rights 
are still based on national laws, cooperative efforts to harmonize patent protection around 
the world by industrialized countries may not be successful unless developing countries can 
also benefit from strengthening their patent regimes.  In order to resolve the conflict 
between innovative economies and technology net-importing countries, international 
negotiations and institutions such as the WTO and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization should perhaps address the ability of developing countries in creating new 
technical knowledge before persuading them to institute stronger patent regimes.  
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Notes: Any person who asserts that a published invention has violated any requirements, stipulated in 
the patent law, of granting a patent, may, within three months from the publication date, submit a 
written opposition application. Upon receipt of a written opposition, the patent office shall re-
examine the issued patent. (Translated from Chinese to English by the Taiwanese Intellectual 
Property Office and posted on the page of its website http://www.tipo.gov.tw/eng/laws/laws.asp) 
Patent opposition cases are reported by year of disposition instead of by year of application. On the 
other hand, anti-counterfeiting cases are reported by year of disposition.  
Sources: Yearbook of Patents and Trademarks, 1990 and 1996, Republic of China. 
Figure 1






































































Notes: This table includes all of the U.S. patents, both utility and design patents, either awarded to Taiwanese residents who filed patent applications 
between 1983 and 1991, or assigned by inventors to Taiwanese assignees. In many cases, multiple individuals are registered as inventors. The location of 
patent origin, whether or not from Taiwan, is, therefore, determined by the residence of the first inventor of each patent. 
Sources: USPTO online patent grant databases (http://www.uspto.gov). 
year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
food and tobacco 2 1 1 1 1 2
textile and apparel 3 3 4 4 6 10 9 5 12
leather 2 6 6 8 7 11 6 8 10
paper 7 3 2 1 4
printing and publishing 2 1 1
wood and furniture 4 6 11 11 19 18 25 28 30
industrial goods 58 73 107 168 230 229 291 430 488
agricultural machinery 1 1 3 2 3 4 3 2
food products machinery 1 3 5 1 4 4
textile machinery 2 1 3 1 2 2 3 3
woodwork machinery 1 1 3 1 1 2
construction machinery 1 6 2 1 8 2
engines and turbines 2 2 2 3 1 10 5 8
industrial goods machinery 6 8 9 12 16 21 31 36 18
office machinery 1 1 4 3 2 4 3 6 9
other machinery 7 8 16 22 20 25 23 31 60
paper machinery 1 1 2 2
printing and publishing machinery 1 2 1 3
service machinery 3 2 2 2 1 6 7
construction 3 2 2 3 4 7 8 8
electronic and electrical 34 47 84 111 142 183 265 306 431
transportation equipment 4 9 11 10 21 22 41 49 47
instruments 6 14 14 26 39 44 50 52 65
miscellaneous manufacturing 23 46 58 63 92 115 132 173 179
service 2 1 2 2 1 1
total 154 230 337 467 621 714 907 1160 1393




























Notes: This table is based on a random sample of all patents awarded by the Taiwanese Patent Office. The total number of patents in the random 
sample is 5277. Among them, 2,725 patents are granted to residents of Taiwan. This table is constructed from the 2725 patents. Because in many 
cases, multiple individuals are registered as inventors, the location of patent origin, whether or not from Taiwan, is determined by the residence 
of the first inventor of each patent. 
Sources: Taiwan Patent Network online patent grant databases (http://www.twpat.com). 
year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
food and tobacco 1 1 1 2
texile and apparel 3 6 5 2 4 2 6 4
leather 1 2 2 2 5 1 1
paper 2 4 1 2 4 3 2
printing and publishing 1 1 1 2 1
wood and furniture 14 11 9 11 11 19 22 26
industrial goods 64 89 79 94 122 97 140 185
agricultural machinery 4 3 2 3 3 4 2 3
food products machinery 1 3 3 1 3 6 2
textile machinery 3 3 3 4 3 10 4 10
woodwork machinery 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 1
construction machinery 2 4 3 4 4 4
engines and turbines 1
industrial goods machinery 16 11 9 12 15 23 25 24
office machinery 1 2 1 3 1 2 2 4
other machinery 8 8 9 5 18 14 10 21
paper machinery 1 1 1 1
printing and publishing machinery 1 1 1 2 2 1
service machinery 1 3 4 4 10 7 3 7
construction 1 2 2 4 1 4 6
electronic and electrical 44 60 63 96 87 99 103 132
transportation equipment 5 10 3 7 15 9 15 17
instruments 9 15 22 20 16 18 16 26
miscellaneous manufacturing 26 34 28 44 48 49 47 40
service
total 206 263 251 322 373 376 417 517















Notes: This table is a consolidation of Table 1. The machinery sector in the table includes engines and 
turbines, and all of the machinery industries. Also, I removed construction and miscellaneous 
manufacturing industries because I do not have supplementary data such as exports and R&D on these 
two industries. 















Notes: See Table 3. 
year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
food and tobacco 1 1 1 1 2
textile and apparel 3 4 4 6 10 9 5 12
leather 6 6 8 7 11 6 8 10
paper and publish 7 5 3 2 4
wood and furniture 6 11 11 19 18 25 28 30
industrial goods 73 107 168 230 229 291 430 488
machinery 23 40 54 55 72 76 100 116
electronic and electrical 47 84 111 142 183 265 306 431
transportation equipment 9 11 10 21 22 41 49 47
instruments 14 14 26 39 44 50 52 65
total  181 277 400 525 593 766 978 1205
Table 3 U.S. Patents Granted to Taiwanese residents by Year of Application and Industry
year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
food and tobacco 1 1 1 2
textile and apparel 3 6 5 2 4 2 6 4
leather 1 2 2 2 5 1 1
paper and publish 2 5 2 2 5 2 3 3
wood and furniture 14 11 9 11 11 19 22 26
industrial goods 64 89 79 94 122 97 140 185
machinery 37 32 35 42 58 73 60 77
electronic and electrical 44 60 63 96 87 99 103 132
transportation equipment 5 10 3 7 15 9 15 17
instruments 9 15 22 20 16 18 16 26
total  179 229 221 276 321 326 366 471



























Notes: In this table, I summed up the R&D spending of the ten industries reported in Table 3 and 4 
and then derived the real R&D spending, by using GDP deflators. The GDP deflators were calculated 
from Taiwanese GDP data. The reference year is 1996. 
Sources: Information on R&D spending is from the Yearly Indicators of Science and Technology, 1991-2001, 
published by the Taiwanese National Science Council. GDP data are from the online economic 
database provided by the Taiwanese Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics 
(http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas03/bs8/dbase/data.htm).  
Figure 2  
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Notes: I summed up both the R&D spending and the production values of the ten industries reported 
in Table 3 and 4 each year between 1983 and 1991 and then derived the fractions by dividing them.  
Sources: See Figure 2. 
 
Figure 3 
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Source: Table 3 and 4. 
Figure 4



































































































Notes:  The U.S. series are derived by only using utility patent applications and grants that were filed by 
and awarded to Taiwanese residents. On the other hand, the Taiwanese patent series include all the 
three kinds of patents – invention, new utility model, and new design – issued by the Taiwanese Patent 
Office. 
Sources: Data on Taiwanese patent applications filed by residents of Taiwan are from the  Yearly 
Indicators of Science and Technology, 1991-2001, published by the Taiwanese National Science Council. The 
numbers of Taiwanese patent grants going to Taiwanese residents are from the online patent database 
provided by Taiwan Patent Network. Data on the US utility patent applications applied by Taiwanese 
inventors are from the report – Number of Utility Patent Applications Filed in the United States By Country of 
Origin, Calendar Years 1965 to Present – 2001, USPTO Technology Assessment and Forecast branch 
while the numbers of US utility patent grants awarded to Taiwanese inventors are collected from 










































* denotes significance at the 0.05 level, ** the 0.01 level. The reference year is 1984. 
Notes: The regression was estimated over a panel data using a fixed effects model. In addition to the 
variables listed in the table, the independent variables include industry dummy variables to control for 
differences across industries in technology opportunities. The estimated coefficients on these industry 
dummy variables are not reported. “Production” indicates production value of each industry. 
Sources: R&D spending of each industry is from the Yearly Indicators of Science and Technology, 1991-2001, 
published by the Taiwanese National Science Council. Production values across industries are from 
the online economic database provided by the Taiwanese Directorate General of Budget Accounting 
and Statistics. Export volumes are collected from the Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports, June 1993, 





















































Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients of year dummy variables in Table 5. The reference 
year is 1984.  
Figure 6
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* denotes significance at the 0.05 level, ** the 0.01 level. The reference year is 1984. 
Notes: The regression was estimated over a panel data using a fixed effects model. In addition to the 
variables listed in the table, the independent variables include industry dummy variables to control for 
differences across industries in technology opportunities. The estimated coefficients on these industry 
dummy variables are not reported. “Production” indicates production value of each industry. Because 
several industries did not generate any patents in some years, the measure of log (patents/production) 
is, in fact, calculated by log [(patent count + 1)/production].  
Sources: R&D spending of each industry is from the Yearly Indicators of Science and Technology, 1991-2001, 
published by the Taiwanese National Science Council. Production values across industries are from 
the online economic database provided by the Taiwanese Directorate General of Budget Accounting 
and Statistics. Export volumes are collected from the Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports, June 1993, 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of China. Patent counts are from Table 3 and 4. 




















































Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients of year dummy variables in Table 5. The reference 
year is 1984.                                                                                                                        
Figure 7









1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Estimated coefficients of year
dummies (US patent counts) 
Estimated coefficients of year












Sources: Production values across industries are from the online economic database provided by the Taiwanese Directorate General of Budget Accounting and 



















1984 12.255 4.418 28.844 28.543 57.987 56.296 49.337 48.452 58.684 73.901
1985 12.462 5.241 28.660 31.352 56.968 54.041 49.329 49.198 58.953 63.635
1986 16.256 6.488 28.882 32.760 61.929 52.243 47.890 49.486 60.892 76.672
1987 17.129 6.170 29.534 29.298 66.771 49.034 49.278 49.155 64.404 82.091
1988 14.562 7.590 27.756 26.384 69.460 43.959 50.593 50.648 62.701 82.171
1989 13.302 7.506 25.918 24.504 66.329 40.091 53.365 52.276 59.042 83.560
1990 12.926 9.305 24.990 27.312 51.584 39.846 54.255 54.069 57.059 82.043
1991 14.878 10.364 25.192 28.239 47.710 37.884 55.759 57.369 57.922 90.671
























Notes: I summed up R&D spending and production values of the four domestic-oriented industries – 
food and tobacco, paper and publish, industrial goods, and transportation equipment.  I then 
computed the shares of R&D spending to production values. I also calculated R&D spending in real 
terms by using GDP deflators. The GDP deflators were derived from Taiwanese GDP data. The 
reference year is 1996. 
Sources: Information on R&D spending is from the Yearly Indicators of Science and Technology, 1991-2001, 
published by the Taiwanese National Science Council. Data on industrial production are from the 






















 Expenditure on R&D in Real Terms and as a Share of Production 



















































Notes: I summed up R&D spending and production values of the six export-oriented industries.  I then 
computed the shares of R&D spending to production values. I also calculated R&D spending in real 
terms by using GDP deflators. The GDP deflators were derived from Taiwanese GDP data. The 
reference year is 1996. 
Sources: See Figure 8.  
Figure 9
 Expenditure on R&D in Real Terms and as a Share of Production 














































Notes:  The export-oriented industries comprise of textile and apparel, leather, wood and furniture, machinery, electronic and electric, 
and instruments industries. The domestic-oriented industries, on the other hand, are food and tobacco, paper and publish, industrial 
goods, and transportation equipment sectors. 
Sources: see Table 3. 
Figure 10
Number of US Patents Awarded to Taiwanese Residents by Year of 







































Notes: I summed up R&D spending and production values of the four non-patent-oriented industries – 
food and tobacco, paper and publish, textile and apparel, and leather.  I then computed the shares of 
R&D spending to production values. I also calculated R&D spending in real terms by using GDP 
deflators. The GDP deflators were derived from Taiwanese GDP data. The reference year is 1996. 









    
Figure 11
















































Notes: I summed up R&D spending and production values of the six patent-reliant industries.  I then 
computed the shares of R&D spending to production values. I also calculated R&D spending in real 
terms by using GDP deflators. The GDP deflators were derived from Taiwanese GDP data. The 
reference year is 1996. 
Sources: See Figure 8. 
Figure 12





















































Notes:  The non-patent-reliant industries comprise of food and tobacco, textile and apparel, leather, paper and publish industries. The 
patent-reliant industries, on the other hand, are wood and furniture, industrial goods, machinery, electronic and electric, transportation 
equipment, and instruments sectors. 
Sources: see Table 3. 
Figure 13
Number of US Patents Awarded to  Taiwanese Residents by Year of 






































Sources: Production values across industries are from the online economic database provided by the Taiwanese Directorate General of Budget Accounting and 


















1984 0.000432 0.000506 0.000800 0.001650 0.000914 0.002233 0.004027 0.004199 0.003532 0.006762
1985 0.000318 0.000348 0.000646 0.000639 0.001203 0.002568 0.001932 0.007857 0.007948 0.006332
1986 0.000275 0.001857 0.001501 0.000913 0.001197 0.003319 0.002247 0.002316 0.003526 0.006535
1987 0.001068 0.000562 0.002089 0.001670 0.003460 0.003850 0.007022 0.004135 0.006092 0.008712
1988 0.000403 0.000184 0.001863 0.001111 0.001716 0.002629 0.008542 0.004482 0.005967 0.010082
1989 0.000537 0.004111 0.001898 0.001479 0.000901 0.004657 0.003621 0.006627 0.011124 0.013979
1990 0.000292 0.000526 0.002455 0.001737 0.003735 0.003712 0.003404 0.004120 0.009458 0.023533
1991 0.000183 0.004127 0.001626 0.001718 0.003678 0.004343 0.005616 0.004553 0.008963 0.020722
Average 0.000438 0.001528 0.001610 0.001365 0.002100 0.003414 0.004551 0.004786 0.007076 0.012082


































* denotes significance at the 0.05 level, ** the 0.01 level. The reference year is 1984. 
Notes: The regression was estimated over a panel data using a fixed effects model. In addition to the variables listed in the table, the independent variables include industry 
dummy variables to control for differences across industries in technology opportunities. The estimated coefficients on these industry dummy variables are not reported. 
Production indicates production value of each industry. Because several industries did not generate any patents in some years, the measure of log (patents/production) is, in 
fact, calculated by log [(patent count + 1)/production].  
year 0.097 0.101 0.098 0.137 0.124 0.125 0.119 0.124 0.126 0.025 0.019
(0.047)* (0.043)* (0.042)* (0.076) (0.083) (0.083) (0.046)* (0.045)** (0.042)** (0.073) (0.075)
reform 0.259 0.196 0.261 0.232
(0.223) (0.326) (0.205) (0.351)
Log(exports/production) -0.123 0.199 -0.138 -0.36 -0.125 0.177 -0.315 -0.202 -0.921 0.204 0.504
(0.616) (0.075) (0.743) (0.570) (0.7360 (0.830) (0.621) (0.787) (0.909) (0.618) (0.755)
log(RD-1/production-1)  0.119 0.103 0.084 -0.495 -0.419 -0.506 0.143 0.104 -0.002 -0.042 -0.028
(0.112) (0.104) (0.102) (0.297) (0.339) (0.358) (0.148) (0.148) (0.143) (0.172) (0.181)
high-RD-intensive*reform 1.013 0.246 0.523
(0.314)** (0.496) (0.253)*


























Constant -11.277 -8.772 -11.536 -17.423 -13.959 -16.459 -8.659 -8.803 -9.976 -11.42 -10.849
(0.900)** (0.831)** (0.941)** (2.355)** (2.836)** (3.208)** (1.023)** (1.075)** (1.120)** (1.645)** (1.814)**
R
2 0.510 0.630 0.670 0.340 0.360 0.380 0.620 0.650 0.730 0.140 0.200
N 48 48 48 32 32 32 48 48 48 32 32
Table 9   The Effect of Patent Reform on Patenting in the U.S. across Industries
Panel B: Patent-Reliant Industries VS Non-Patent-Reliant Industries Panel A: Export-Oriented Industries VS Domestic-Oriented Industries
dependent variable: log(US patents/production)
patent-reliant industries (ref=wood) non-patent-reliant (ref=food)
dependent variable: log(US patents/production)

































* denotes significance at the 0.05 level, ** the 0.01 level. The reference year is 1984. 
Notes: The regression was estimated over a panel data using a fixed effects model. In addition to the variables listed in the table, the independent variables include industry 
dummy variables to control for differences across industries in technology opportunities. The estimated coefficients on these industry dummy variables are not reported. 
Production indicates production value of each industry. 
year 0.052 0.05 0.046 0.056 0.061 0.057 -0.018 -0.015 -0.015 0.178 0.18
(0.076) (0.080) (0.081) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.095) (0.101)
reform 0.275 0.31 0.556 -0.032
(0.362) (0.200) (0.217)* (0.446)
Log(exports/production) 0.464 0.337 0.01 -0.115 -0.35 -0.162 0.869 1.215 1.17 -0.698 -0.834
(0.997) (1.374) (1.427) (0.351) (0.431) (0.499) (0.659) (0.843) (1.071) (0.809) (1.015)
high-RD-intensive*reform 0.577 0.266 0.8
(0.579) (0.292) (0.271)**


























Constant -6.21 -6.282 -6.464 -6.571 -7.009 -6.658 -5.272 -5.01 -5.044 -8.257 -8.471
(0.582)** (0.787)** (0.816)** (0.660)** (0.809)** (0.935)** (0.510)** (0.647)** (0.818)** (1.282)** (1.604)**
2 0.16 0.17 0.2 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.28 0.3
N 48 48 48 32 32 32 48 48 48 32 32
Panel A: Export-Oriented Industries VS Domestic-Oriented Industries Panel B: Patent-Reliant Industries VS Non-Patent-Reliant Industries
Table 10   The Effect of Patent Reform on R&D across Industries 
export-oriented industries (ref=cloth) domestic-oriented industries (ref=food)
dependent variable: log(R&D spending/production)
patent-reliant industries (ref=wood) non-patent-reliant (ref=food)

























Notes: The figures reported in the graph are inclusive of all investment made in Taiwan. 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook on Overseas Chinese & Foreign Investment, Technical Cooperation Outward, Technical Cooperation, Indirect 



























Notes: The figures reported in the graph are the sum of investment made in the ten major manufacturing sectors. Sources: 
Statistical Yearbook on Overseas Chinese & Foreign Investment, Technical Cooperation Outward, Technical Cooperation, Indirect 
Mainland Investment, Guide of Mainland Industry Technology, 1996, the Republic of China.  
Figure 14
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Figure 15
















































Notes: Chemical classes denote chemical discipline classes within the U.S. Patent Classification System. 
Sources: Technology Access and Forecast Report, Chemical Classes, 1995 and 2003, USPTO Technology Assessment and 
Forecast branch.  
Figure 16








































Notes: Electrical classes denote electrical discipline classes within the U.S. Patent Classification System. 







































































Notes: Mechanical classes denote mechanical discipline classes within the U.S. Patent Classification System. 
Sources: Technology Access and Forecast Report, Mechanical Classes, 1995 and 2003, USPTO Technology Assessment and 
Forecast branch.  
Figure 18
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patent counts
Taiwan
Singapore
South Korea
Israel
South Africa
Argentina